Relations amongst anxiety, anonymity, and the open space of the public

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We are never entirely private beings. Aside from the Greek admonition regarding the 'idiocy' of the purely private person, we are always, even to the mirror of our imagination, the mind's fourth eye, performing some set of scripts and roles of greater or lesser value. We are often the singularity of our own audiences, but we are always and already aware of what society expects of us, even by ourselves. The more radical 'invitation' to self-understanding that comes from the alien objectificity of nature is also present within the envelope of social shelter, even though we must reject its immediacy in favor of the immanence of thought. This thinking at once absents us from others, though it does not excuse us from them: "The invitation to anonymity comes from being, from the very structure of mundane things. [ ] Anxiety senses emptiness, void, opening up in the interstices of being." (Lingis, 1989:112). This kind of absence is also everywhere, but not at once, as it were, with one's being in the world. We fill up the empty space, at least in its immanence. We cannot, of course, fill up the interstitial space that provides the necessary but disconcerting distances between beings. We cannot accomplish this alone, but it is accomplished, nevertheless, by our co-mingling with others, with our Mitsein. This absence is not only felt where there are no actual others, as if one were walking the wild beach with no one else in sight, but occurs also in the original space of massive anonymity in which Offentlichkeit takes place.[i] We are surrounded by thousands of others, fellow human beings, but we know them not, and cannot seem to reach out to them, as we will see in the following section that in fact we must do. This kind of absence, the impersonal of day to day social relations can in fact be made personal. You can 'make someone's day' at any time through, as the bumper sticker says, practicing 'random acts of kindness'. As cliché as this may be, it does make a difference in the modern world, and so we are told, in the ancient one as well given the origin of our idea of the Samaritan and thus the 'neighbor. On top of this, the sense that our subjectivity has been lost in the midst of a crowd of objects, and that we too are but an object for all of these others who surrounds me, lends credence to the experience of absence. This experience has a mytho-poetic primordiality about it, that we feel more, ironically, when we are within wild nature and not the urbanity of the social: "

The embedding of the germinal ego in the uroboros corresponds sociologically to the state in which collective ideas prevailed, and the group and group consciousness were dominant. In this state the ego was not an autonomous, individualized entity with a knowledge, morality, volition, and activity of its own; it functioned solely as part of the group, and the group with its superordinate power was the only real subject." (Neumann, 1970:109 [1949]). The subject-object distinction, though only a rubric, could not exist in this kind of social organization or human imagination. This is why transformer beings populate the active consciousness of peoples in mechanical solidarity. Whatever else they may have been to the senses of those conditioned by certain mythic archetypes, the experience of the surrounding nature and its differences was bridged symbolically and poetically, and perhaps even existentially within the ambit of the trophotropic states of vision quests and the like, by these figures. Our contemporary analysis of these beings and their form of being falls short of understanding their symbolic import as vessels of transfiguration. It is the latter day religions of the agrarian epoch that have managed to keep some of these forms alive, albeit *sotto voce*, in the more metaphysical abstractions of concepts like reincarnation and resurrection. Unlike objectifying discourses, marking out space with stricter empirical boundaries, symbolic or 'magical' thinking leaves borders fluid, so that beings, including oneself, can pass through them with some ritual or psychic effort. By contrast, "Psychology [ ] is not in a position to make metaphysical statements. It can only establish that the symbolism of psychic wholeness coincides with the God-image, but it can never prove that the God-image is God himself, or that the self takes the place of God." (Jung, 1959:189 [1951]). In the absence of known others, their intimacies and intricacies, we might well fall back on the notion that all, including myself, are fallen. This Verfallen of the thrownness of beings into the world seems to cast us about at random, and the only connections we can make seem also of the random variety. This is sociologically very much not the case, of course, as we even calculate, on the level of the perception of the generalized other, with whom we can fall in love well before we do so. We experience ourselves in a manner akin to the hero because we take on the efforts of falling in love, or the like, but the task at hand is not about becoming known and knowable to an utterly foreign object, but rather to a subject quite like myself in many ways. In coming together, both persons must feel, however, that they have been set apart from the rest for the specific reason of meeting this singular other. 'We were meant for one another' is a phrase I myself have heard many times, and have also uttered. The fact that such 'meanings', such 'place meants', are mostly temporary only lends them a further fever, an anxious ardor: "He is a human being like the others, mortal and collective like them, yet at the same time he feels himself a stranger to the community." (Neumann, op. cit. 136). It is absence of community that promotes our desire for intimacy, and in this Offentlichkeit merges right into Epektasis. The 'heroic' character of love or friendship, its loyalties and shared experiences, its companionship and 'do or die' efforts on behalf of its own collective conscience, manifesting itself in the 'marriage conversation' that develops for companionate spouses over the years, is commonplace enough. All of this seems a fair distance from the cosmogonical narratives of sentience, since the immediacy and immanentiality of intimacy are experienced as something already known, hence the idea of 'being meant' for someone. But "…there is nevertheless a connection between the hero as bearer of the ego, with its power to discipline the will and mold the personality, and the formative phase in which the gods are crystallized out of the mass of impersonal forces." (ibid:161). This connection is precisely the ability of the individual to act out, or re-enact the birth, not of consciousness in general, but of conscience, the ethical understanding of two persons united in a common

cause. In this, we are reminded of our wider duty to the common good of the community in which we are ensconced, and perhaps, though more difficult for us even today, the global predicament of the human species as a whole. It is true that intimacy can quite literally breed bigotry, as when we consider our own children to be more important than any others, or those of the others, but this shows itself or what it is when arraigned by the light of ethics.

Yet there is another path that reaches the same understanding of duty and obligation to others and to the common good, however defined, that rests at the discursive level and does not necessarily need the succor of intersubjective intimacy, at least not its philia and eros. This is the language of modern science, which has inherited, or rather, acted as the disinheriting agent against, the collective suasion of religion. This knowledge is not, however, that of symbols, other than the artificial *lingua franca* of its practice. "On the contrary, it is a kind of knowledge which for the first time makes possible a novel relation to practice, namely, that of constructive projection and application." (Gadamer 1993:6 [1972]). This recent discourse differs also from symbolic thought in an objective manner, and not merely that of transcending the subjectivity of intimacy or the intersubjective world or human relations for their own sake. Its 'motive force' is the control of nature and of the life of nature within humanity. This contrasts mightily with the idea that such forces could only control humanity and one thus could only enter into some kind of partnership with these forces to manipulate specific moments of their weighty course, through the intercession of shamans or the use of magic, for example: "The motive force that produces these configurations cannot be distinguished from the transconscious factor known as instinct. There is, therefore, no justification for visualizing the archetype as anything other than the image of instinct in man." (Jung, op. cit. 179). Furthermore, the *modernity of knowing* – its science and its anonymity, its rationality along with its subjective conceits and yet also its self-doubts – also places itself away from it origins in a radical manner. It carries its collective suasion outside of the sphere of culture, or so it claims, and thus states that its knowledge is of interest to us in the highest degree while at the same time it itself has no interest in us unless as another object of its discourse. By contrast, "A mythological apperception of the world and an archetypal, instinctive mode of reaction are accordingly characteristic of the dawn man." (Neumann, op. cit. 274). This 'image of the instinct' in humankind is the beginning of subjectivity. Before this, when proto-hominid life was very much a part of the nature that had begotten it, such a distinction could not be possible. Even today, we do not know how animal life experiences itself in the world, or whether there is any kind of demarcation between its nascent sentience and the nature in which it is enveloped. It is true that some animals exhibit learned behavior, however, but this in itself is not enough to suggest with any certainty that the space of the animal-being and the space of nature are differentiated. Certainly, they do not appear to be so in the manner that we as humans must confront. For nature, the only space is everywhere, and when our understanding of the cosmos mimics this situation with its own sentiment, it is a sign that we both long to comprehend that which amounts to the whole and of which we are but a part as well as standing apart, and to rejoin it in some way.

The major way in which we attempt to do both of these things has to do with Offentlichkeit. We come to know our sociality, our fuller humanity, through the space of public discourse which is always 'about' something, in the same way that adults wonder about things and children are able to experience simple wonder without taking things into account: "The being-there of Dasein has its *open space of publicness* and its ways of seeing there. It moves (a basic phenomenon) around in a definite mode of discourse about itself: *talk* (technical term). This discourse 'about' itself is the public and average manner in which Dasein has taken itself in hand, holds onto itself, and preserves itself." (Heidegger, 1999:25 [1988], italics the text's). Moving, talking, discoursing, holding, and preserving are not interchangeable conceptions, but they are all one and must be performed everywhere at once for each of their effects to be put into effect. Motion disturbs that which holds onto. Talking adjudicates and alters discourse. Being 'taken into hand' suggests both concern and discipline, and there is even a vernacular phrase that is used to threaten children that borrows from this idea. We cannot expect to understand something only through a constant motion. The dynamic of movement in space and acknowledging that we must limit our movements according to certain rules of discourse, public or scientific, is what conjures the sense of discipline within us. Attenuated and extended from this 'basic phenomenon' are principles that take their place as if they could be enacted everywhere, authentically and with fully conscious consent, and not randomly as in the space of anywhere. At the same time, these principles are also often seen as constraints. If their motion makes us shudder, our emotion pushes them to move with us, sometimes subjectively, and in doing so, their principled and disciplined status is called into question as arbiters of public space: "What can enable us to transcend in this way the limits we normally observe to human moral action? These limits are obvious enough. They include our restricted sympathies, our understandable self-preoccupation, and the common human tendency to define one's identity in opposition to some adversary or group." (Taylor, 1989:398). Indeed, in shaking the tree that the fruit of morality has sprung from, we realize that it is precisely through such limitations as these that our morality comes to known as relative. Others have other morals. There is nothing, short of murder on a mass scale, which can alter this fact of human diversity. Now, that said, there may be other kinds of action that allow us to both comprehend the morality of the other and perhaps also shed some light on a structure that is 'preserved' across cultures and that many, if not all, humans might be guided by. The enlightenment ideal that all humans are born out of the whole cloth of a universalizing ethics is likely mistaken. The singular difference between the 'dawn man' of mechanical solidarity and mythic thought and our modern situatedness in the opened and lighted space of subject and object, authority and politics, alone makes this dream untenable and unrealistic.[ii] At the same time, we are rapidly making all human beings into much the same thing, and it then becomes a choice regarding morality about exactly what this sameness will be or can be (cf. Lösch, 1967:192ff [1945]). Offentlichkeit is the space in which such questions will be proffered and debated, as these are questions that are specifically contemporary: "A mode in which the today makes itself present, in which therefore one already sees something like Dasein, is the *open space of publicness* which belongs to the being-there of Dasein. This publicness actualizes itself by passing around and sustaining definite kinds of discourse about…opinions about… The discourse circulates everywhere and about everything… "(Heidegger, op. cit. 38, italics the text's). We know we are present in the world of today – and not the history of memory that embodies its subject in the world of yesterday, nor in the projects of action that imagine the world of tomorrow as an object – when we hear and participate in through 'talk' the topics du jour. These may be fashion and fetish, they may be contrived and constructed in media or elsewhere, but they arrest us as

the way in which Dasein enters into its own projects in the light of what is going on around it.[iii] All the more so if we are detained by distractions, as in anywhere or even in the outer space that rests between the here and the there, we must attain a focus and perspective that can only be had through participating in discourses about the world and its forms. Everywhere appears to us as seamless. It is not a cameo raising its head as a serial archipelago, guises of itself linked only below the surface of things. No, all of it is present all at once and it is we who must learn to discriminate between its presence and our own, the world and the person and their combinations: "The personal world is not a set of islands amid impersonal nature, rather impersonal nature becomes a mere objective pole of unified intentionalities of harmoniously living monads that make contact through this objectivity. The access to it is reflection, self-grasping, in pure originality and self-certainty." (Patocka, 2003:4). Thus the 'discourses about' have their terminus in the opened space of selfhood. We are 'talking' about ourselves in relation to the world and its forms. The formality of this is embodied in discourse, scientific, historical or otherwise, and insofar as we grasp our selfhood in space we can be self-certain. But this is only the certainty of a form of being in the world that takes itself formally and uses formulas to attend to its needs. The certainty of the object eludes it. They can be accessed only through the sensibility that harkens back to the mytho-poetic sentience of previous worldviews. Not that this older discourse lends cantor to the subject, quite the contrary, as it invites us to abandon ourselves to the transpersonal meanings that unite large groups of people, if not the entire species. We may value this very highly, but we cannot know it as part of our subjectivity, and in this, it makes us much less 'self-certain': "Collective ideals have no subjective feeling-tone, but nevertheless retain their feeling-value. This value, therefore, cannot be demonstrated by subjective symptoms…" (Jung, op. cit. 29). Any symptomatology of the self would have to take place in Offentlichkeit. Only there does its specific order in relation to the 'demands of the day' come to light. It gives up its secrets, takes a break from its occlusiveness upon which it may have spend a fair amount of energy – as when we must get along with work colleagues who annoy us, for instance, or sometimes much worse, one's family members – in the everywhere of 'daylight', the everydayness of the wide awake being in the world as it is. At once, we may share through talk the results of this expenditure of energy, the outcomes of carving out a private space in which indeed yet more privation of the self may be required. For, "…the being-there of the secret belongs no more to the private than to the public. It is not a deprived interiority that one would have to reveal, confess, announce, that is, to which one would have to respond by accounting for it and thematizing it in broad daylight." (Derrida, op. cit. 25). What we carry within us we carry into the open space of the public. Its publicness may be shrouded in formalities and formulas, but its presence remains. It retains its secretive character even when divulged, because when we ask each other about whether or not we wish to 'know a secret', it is not the fact that we now may know it that alters its hiddenness. We ourselves are now part of its seclusion. Have been allowed to enter a sacred space of knowing and thus being – as with the rituals of transformative theater to which Nietzsche alluded and of which Clutesi narrates as key moments in his culture's folktales – and hence we must now commit to being part of the secret both privately and publicly. Indeed, our privacy itself has been extended by such a commitment. We are no longer visitors but natives to the secret and its contents. We thus cannot have any distance, any objectivity about it now that we too are 'in the know': "The visitor's mistake is to establish the same distance between the picture and the title as between the sign and the denoted object, as if the title is speaking *about* the picture from a kind of 'objective distance', and then to look for its positive correspondence in the picture." (Zizek, 1989:178-9, italics the text's). We have been placed 'in the picture', as another vernacular phrase quite aptly puts it, and thus cannot be excerpted from it by oneself. Another who is yet to be taken into such a confidence may do so for us, but this relies on our sleight of hand, our pretense at being also innocent of the experience so close at hand and yet also as yet unnoticed.

There are also plenty of episodes in the realm of Offentlichkeit that, precisely because of their already public status, have the character of being 'open secrets', things or event that everyone does in fact know about but due to the cohesive or centrifugal force of social norm suasion, must pretend do not exist. These have classically been referred to as 'taboos' by anthropologists, but it is not so much that whatever their contents may be is so incendiary or would so compromise the promise of social solidarity that to acknowledge them would bring chaos upon this or that society as they represent another set of ideals that conflict with the day to day goings on of the people inhabiting the open space of publicness. They are, in a word, shared desires that may not actually be shared, at least to any great extent. The work necessary to keep what everyone knows to be true in the shadows of the public trust is also subject to the same rules as the submerged ideals themselves: "Certainly, even if this work in no way corresponds to a secret ceremony, one may imagine that there is no ceremony, however public and exposed, which does not revolve around a secret, even if it is the secret of a nonsecret." (Derrida, op. cit. 7). Children are the standard bearers of the exposition of all taboos. They light the margins of public space by their inability – and not necessarily their unwillingness – to engage the public trust, their inability to be duplicitous about social role, and their fragile sense of the generalized other. As annoying or amusing as such events of exposition may be, the emperor's nudity is paraded often enough everywhere and by everyone at one time or another for us to be familiar with the results of these *eclaircissements*, the key factor for everywhere in its public aspect is that we adults do not superimpose ourselves on the ideals we are supposedly sworn to protect. We cannot, in other words, take social norms too personally as if they were either suffocating our subjectivity or that we, as subjects, are their sole source and guardian: "…a healthy collective culture is possible only when secondary personalization is not carried to the point of absurdity; if it is too radical, it leads to false projections of the transpersonal and to the phenomenon of recollectivization…" (Neumann, op. cit. 339). We speak of a 'healthy' cultural 'climate', in recognizance of the idea that the atmosphere of intersubjectivity can be altered for better or worse through the distance we maintain with regard to our social role as the upholders of norms. We need not 'believe' in them as one might a God or even in oneself, but we must act as if we do, especially in front of children and, not to make too strong an analogy here, in front of criminals and other 'deviants' who may be tempted to upset the norms for their own nefarious purposes, purposes which, I think, children almost never have in any serious way (cf. Wu 2001:98ff for Watsuji's take on the intersubjectivity of climate to this regard). On top of this, if we do not intend to lose the landscape of local norms in the hyper-subjectivity of personalization – its 'secondary' status may be seen in its tendency to personification, as occurs often in the interpretation of literature whereby characters take on more mythic or archetypal guises and thus retreat from their subjectivity and, in

many cases, also their humanity – we need the layout of any Offentlichkeit to support the adult pretenses that keep 'open secrets' at a healthy objectifying distance form those of us who would take on their mantle for personal gain (cf. Lösch, 1967:440ff [1945] and footnote 17 for a comment on the public 'spirit' of such layouts). Finally, there must also be a sense that the ideals which are both supported and shrouded by normative action in public spaces are themselves representing yet another space where the actual sources and origins of these ideals have their place. This other world, also 'everywhere' in its ground and fundament, *does* require our belief to the extent that acknowledge that cultural ideals have an objective source. Here' 'objective' most often refers to the distance between our picture of those ideals in action – the reality of society seldom 'lives up', as the casual phrase has it, to its ideals for obvious reasons – and the 'titles' we honor them with. The discourse 'about' ideals that includes their titles can be called 'dogma': "…dogma is 'believed; it is hypostasized, as the Protestants hypostasize the Bible, illegitimately making it the supreme authority, regardless of its contradictions and controversial interpretations." (Jung, op. cit. 179). Just as Durkheim famously identified the source of religion in society 'itself' in the autochthony of its worship and adoration laying about the public space as a form of hypostasy, the distance necessary for such a contraption to 'work' disallows the individual to take credit for its workings. Unlike the personalization of dogmatic exegesis, wherein a too public accreditation of everywhere is conceived to be the source of human authority, or that our authority may be directly derived from that on high – in its own way, this results in the same subterfuge as does the child's more 'innocent' exposition of the arbitrary sources of all social norms; that their authority is displaced into the subjectivity of the person involved – any mature hermeneutic takes into account that the "…vantage point outside of the historical and practical reality of *ningen sonzai* [ ] does not suffice as a category of analysis because of its one-sidedness with respect to *ningen's* intersubjective reality." (Wu, 2001:99). It is precisely the nature of dogma to deliberately construct such a 'one-sided' view of things, and the notion of interpretation is itself lost, along with the original sense of why such ideals, whatever they may be and howsoever their sources are beholden.

The distanciation of the sources of public action in the space of everywhere connotes both that Offentlichkeit is 'to be used' as the means of intersubjectivity on the way to authenticity – simply due to its perceived link-up with the sources of our cultural ideals; we are 'playing them out', as it were, in such a space as opposed to the 'just playing' for its own sake that occurs in anywhere – and that its 'publicness' is a testament to the good will and faith we have in our own behaviors, as long as they ascend in the direction of the ideals and not away from them. But once again, as Durkheim noted, 'deviance' holds within its objections a necessary element of objectivity as it allows the rest of us to grasp the reason for our generally conformative action in the world. That this action occurs 'between' subjects and is the fluid medium by which the space of Offentlichkeit is traversed and navigated also presents a key element: "As *ningen*, then, as betweenness, an important aspect of self is not only its subjective spatiality, but also the spatiality evident through the embodiment of self." (McCarthy, 2014:6). Such an embodiment can occur only with the additional confluence of the public space, that is, its publicity and our self's public relations as a set of more or less conforming social role aspects, for instance, gender or ethnicity. As Neumann states, without such 'outside' influences 'children would just be children', in that those who are least likely to uphold social norms must be controlled from without their nascent subjectivity – it has not yet been entirely subjected to the objection society must raise against it – yet from within the very publicity of Offentlichleit, a publicity that promotes the glare of a wider review of any behavior that is judged to depart from the ideal of publicness, that is, from the sense that such action can or is allowable everywhere. We even have a casual phrase that demarcates the attainment of a certain level of publicness in the developing subjectivity of the child, in that he or she can be 'taken anywhere' without too much bother about the upholding of norms. The fulfillment of individuality in our society must, ironically, be left until much later, sometimes even until retirement: "The search for pure subjective expressive fulfillment may make life thin and insubstantial, may ultimately undercut itself [ ] But that by itself does nothing to show that subjective fulfillment is not a good. It shows only that it needs to be part of a 'package'…" (Taylor, op. cit. 511). This 'package' must include community, some sense of faith in something other than the calculatable but still unpredictable happenstance of probability, and the idea that one can leave a legacy in spite of one's limited tenure as an active agency in the world. As Lösch puts it, there can be no 'best location' wherein all of these rather abstract notions of the holistic good may be found to be centered (op. cit. 16). The transient character of modern existence, where persons travel great distances to 'collect', as it were, the sponsorship of the greatest subjective goods in themselves is exploited by anywhere, but given full reign by everywhere. We have come, of late to need the spatiality of everywhere much more so than ever the species did before. We will see later on that the corresponding territory of 'nowhere' has declined, in much the same manner as the space claimed by mystical or religious explication has contracted. Our situation is one of finding ourselves situated in this or that place, none of which can give us everything we imagine we now require for the 'good life'. Work or at least, employment, often does not coincide with one's original community, as we saw in the journey from here to there. This alone excerpts us from the whole cloth of our birthright, even though we also claim the 'right' to subsistence if not to a better quality of life over the long term. But this 'quality', its character and source, is elusive. Just exactly what is it that we are hoping to find in the public space of everywhere? The knowledge that this question could not arise for our ancestors does us little good if the basic structures of their worldview no longer in fact hold. Such becomes, rather, an interesting and perhaps sobering historical query only, and cannot shed light on why the ethical task of intersubjectivity has now altered or what has altered it: "Previously that people were members of a community went without saying. It didn't need to be justified relative to a more basic situation. But now the theory starts from the individual on his own." (Taylor, op. cit. 193). Taylor continues by reminding us that it is our specifically individuated consent that is the source of constructing community today. This covers part of the space of community structures, but not all of it. The state does not ask our consent, nor does the family when we are children. Nor do schools and for some, churches. But of course, when we attain the full rights of adulthood, we can, if we wish, slough most of these communities off. But there is another, more primordial community to which all of us belong and from which there is no egress. That is the collective psyche of humanity, the character of what we are as uniquely conscious human organisms, with all of the wonder and doubt that brings with it. Our abilities and our disabilities are defined in a more basic manner than with communities constructed by intersubjectivity, and also sometimes, with individual consent. We do not need to subscribe to the theory of the collective unconscious to understand that human beings are related to one

another, no matter what cultural space they are hailing from. This is evidenced by our history of communication, however partial, and by the fact that persons from one culture can adapt to another, adeptly adopting the new ways of the world with which they are confronted.[iv] The spatiality of everywhere, especially in its public aspect, its mode of being 'for the public' or 'as a public' or polis, is expansive in the manner in which it challenges our originally narrow experiences of the world: "One result of this expansion of consciousness is that, regardless of conflicting national ideologies, every modern consciousness is confronted with that of other nations and races and with other cultures, other economic patterns, religions, and systems of value." (Neumann, op. cit. 437). This unavoidable situatedness transforms Mitsein into the distanciated *Fragwurdigheit* associated with the hard landing of Dasein's thrown project into the world. One finds one must work, and work diligently, to create community from a series of monadic and nomadic subjects who, through their own transience and attempts to weave together the exiguous threads of an existential tapestry, also wander about everywhere as do we.

We cannot guarantee success in any of this business. We may get to know much of the diverse contours of everywhere in its public mode – the privacy of cross-cultural situations and the nuances of different human tongues, including those of the dead, will most often escape us, but it escapes *all* of us, and should not be viewed as a burden specific to my competence or incompetence – but there are certain limits. Time is no doubt one of these. One cannot choose the time in which one lives. But the choice of spaces ameliorates to a great extent the temporal limitation. Ne might say that it is space that allows human beings to be, and not so much time, which in its on-running causes it eventually not to be. 'Being and Space' are complementary. We encounter their most intimate companionship in the topology of the other whom I love or desire. In doing so, we are reflected back into an autotopology of the subjectitude of being-with, or being-loved, or of desiring being in orexis and, as we shall shortly observe, through the Epektasis of everywhere, reaching into us as we reach out into it. For "…we are, each by his or her own existing, exposed to the surfaces of alterity that the perceptual arena of each will be, has to be, is obliged to be, assembled into the oneness of a universe in which the earth will be constituted in common." (Lingis, 1989:190). Such a general obligation is ironically brought about precisely due to the difference that threaten to destroy us, rather than the structures of similitude in time and space and as human beings that unite us as a matter of course or as an evolutionary given. Just as modern consciousness has withheld its consent from automatic lifelong community – with the exception of the state in principle; but even here, in many countries we can at least effect a change in who appears to lead the state on our behalf, thereby dispensing with some of the sense that we are prisoners of an abstract would-be community that assumes our cooperation or otherwise demands it – we have also bridled at the idea that we should be linked by some transcultural force or substrate to those we find quite alien or even disgusting.

We thus discover the same problem in space as we were already aware existed in time. Our ancestors, however incompetent and ignorant, are dead and gone. They do not annoy us in the way that our contemporaries can and do. We are forced to confront the problem of anathematic temporality in its spatial form through the everywhere of public openness. Difference is indeed all around us and is quite transparently public, especially in metropolitan centers, where the older notion of 'cosmopolitan' has become commonplace. 'Spatial consciousness' is thus the much more common version of *Wirkung-geschichte* that has most often been lensed only through an auto-history of philosophical tropes: "This means: Historical consciousness is 'there' in such a fashion that it brings itself *into the open space of publicness with a definite self-interpretation,* holds itself in this publicness, lingers in it, pervades it, and thus dominates it." (Heidegger, op. cit. 43, italics the text's). History cannot be present in any literal sense. It has a presence that is felt b us simply because we have a memory. How collective this memory can be today is somewhat mysterious. Our own subjective experiences, fading even to black in some cases conveniently, or else being rewritten to suit the demands of our day, do not automatically link up with those of the others, especially at any cultural distance. It is always somewhat of an astonishment to find, whether in one's marriage or in the geo-political world news this or that evening, that the other simply does not see things the same way as I do. This is because everywhere contains all vantage points, and unlike anywhere, none of the views beheld from these alternate positions is quite the same,. Very often, or often enough, they are radically transposed. This effect takes us beyond Roshamon and farther than the parallax. Such is the distance these differing views exhibit that we instead must rely on serious dialogue, the 'throwing of words across' these gulfs, and in particular the dialectic imbedded in any dialogue, to recover our equanimity. This must be done immediately when it comes to intimacies such as the marriage conversation, and equally so, must be done, but with more caution and less expectation, on the world stage.

Ultimately, spatial consciousness brings to the foreground of having to maintain one's motion even when standing still or taking a position, taking a place or placing oneself at this point in the folds of Offentlichkeit. Everywhere brings home to us the need for a self-understanding that is not itself but stands under the other to whom we are presented: "In this self-interpretation, it brings to language what it thinks it is all about and comes to, and it does this with respect to the Dasein of life itself." (ibid). Language at first divides us, until we realize that it presents to us the only means of reunion. The shape and form of language in space, signage, logos, architectural styles, hand signals, etc., is the starting place for communicative efforts at piecing together the whole of subjectivity, even more so than is the verbal. What inspires us is the challenge of difference. This may take us down the shadowy road of dissension and distrust, but it may also push us along the path of Epektasis, its ethical circumference aiming at reconciliation or at the very least, mediation. We desire to know something of the other in the same manner as we are curious to observe the other side of the hill, the next valley, or the end of the road. It is an emotional drive. And one that seeks its own communion. In the past, we could rely on regular corroborrees of community, or yet later, rituals of transfiguration that brought the gods to earth, spoken or acted into being: "The emotional fusion then sweeps away all the still feebly developed differences of conscious structure in the individuals concerned and continually restores the original group unity." (Neumann, op. cit. 272). But today these historical patterns are long lifeless, coopted by the shill of advertising or the shrill of politics. We are justly suspicious of anything that takes their form. Yet as alert and conscientious we may pride ourselves as being with regard to the anywhere that continually intrudes on everywhere and tries to transform it into its own self-same image, we are still left with a mighty problem. How the, do we reunite with our own life's unity in the face of the disintegrating face of

plenitude as we can now encounter it? And this is only the subjectivity of the question. Is there, beyond our own sense that we have lived this life and it must be, however fragmented, in the end a single thing and a single set of experiences, an objectively valuable space of being where every one of us is welcomed through what we share with one another?

Notes:

[i] Coexistence as a simple fact of sharing a topography radically limited by interplanetary space is not enough to generate community or the 'publicness' that overcomes agora through authentic intersubjectivity. (cf. Also Lingis, op. cit. 53 where he speaks of the Kantian idea of 'internal bonds'.)

[ii] At the same time, as Taylor is wont to point out, such an "…independence can become a very shallow affair, in which masses of people each try to express their individuality in stereotyped fashion. (op. cit. 40).

[iii] Indeed, we come to recognize quite rapidly that we need to know more about "..a thousand things that are possible against the backdrop of a cosmopolitan attitude – when all this suddenly breaks into the life of a people." (Lösch, op. cit. 193). Such an irruptive events can occur due to other major structural changes that have been on-running for some time, under the surface of daily life, *topological* forces rather than those merely geographical. Neumann suggests including on this list the "…aggregation of masses, decay of the old canon, the schism between conscious and unconscious, and the divorce between the individual and collective…" (op. cit. 383).

[iv] Far smaller and more artificial collectivities also construct both fictional kinship and lineage in order to function as a group: "Even temporary groups such as school classes, regiments, etc., show a tendency to manufacture a history for themselves so as to become a genuine group. They try to make the originary experience upon which the group was founded historic…" (Neumann, op. cit. 421-2). There is a similar process at work that blurs the distinction between folklore and the more recent and very much singularly invented instance of 'fake-lore'.

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