



Commentary: On the Theoretical Intuition of Jungian Archetypes and its Logical Extensions–“Purity and Unconsciousness”

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DESCRIPTION

It is intended by this commentary that a simultaneous partial reflection and partial recount should be detailed. The contents, therefore, are styled in such a manner that they describe the process of thought that structures the article–the most major being the idea of the inferences in the text that govern the “two-step” format of the article; however, it also includes the retrospective introduction of terms like the subjective reality to explicate the collective unconsciousnesses that are apparent for their psychic subjects. This commentary has been written in representation of my previous article that considers the archetypes first proposed it is believed that these offer an incomplete picture of the view that they intend to discuss, and that it can be rectified by an investigatory introduction of the pure state (although it should be noted that the pure faculty bears no resemblance to Kant).

With respect to the aforementioned idea of the reflection, this is achieved in two ways where a rectification of errors in narrative and later conjectures–not originally part of my article have been added for the purpose of assuming a simultaneous role of developing a reasonable liberty to what a commentary should be, and that a monotony in form should be escaped; it is intended that this commentary should cover the validity of the pure state and in explicating the collective unconscious into multitudes of components.

In composing my article, I had predicated it upon two central ideas that each demonstrate their respective components in this two-step inference. The first covers the nature from whence Jung's establishment of the archetypes originated: the collective unconsciousness (a compound term of psychic symbolism that manifests itself in a unified responsiveness among all people, the first inference is to apply the notion of a subjective reality against the collective unconscious that Jung proposes. Although this “subjective reality” is not immediately perceived by us to whom the collective unconscious is eminent, we can certainly understand the divergent causality in which an alternative collective unconscious is manufactured.

The second inference is to assume that the aforementioned construction permits an intrinsic structure that is different to the subjective reality that we ourselves hold, or even can be held by another causal subjective reality that is constructed upon an intrinsic structure identical to our own (however, where the psychic reality should convey different material, but that certainly the same manner of origin is observed) this is achieved with the introduction of the pure state and its associated pure environment. In order to develop the argument into an assurance of its own diffidence against the contemporary, and therefore to introduce a capacity where the subjective reality is so divergent that it is incomparable, the liberty is taken to use the faculty of emotion (itself perceived to be truly original as a determinative faculty for the collective unconscious) as an example.

For to whom the idea the idea of the pure state should seem to be evasive, it is considered to be the space (one which is foreign to us pragmatically, but understandable conceptually) where an emotion (that is, by definition, qualitative) is used in a qualitative rather than quantitative frame–because our semantic idea of what anger is predicated on a singular, semiotic idea, yet we consider anger to be a scalar idea where one's semiotic reception of anger is unchanged, but that anger itself is represented as more or less so–not that it reaches a climax of anger where its true definition is reached, or perhaps a mediocre anger between extremes that is itself exclusively suggestive of anger because these proper and true ideas of anger do not exist.

Importantly, to the tune of the qualitative diffidence that the idea of the pure state enquires, my article understands particularly the disjunction between our world and that of the hypothetical pure state as exhibiting an augmentation in the value of the idea of divergent collective unconsciousnesses, and how it is the only example of a derived set of archetypes (although, granted that the intricate causalities of that world cannot be explored, these archetypes are unknown).

We also understand that religious beliefs are not transformative, for else the idea that “America was not mentioned in the Bible”

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Received: 22-Aug-2024, Manuscript No. JOP-24-26782; **Editor assigned:** 26-Aug-2024, PreQC No. JOP-24-26782 (PQ); **Reviewed:** 09-Sep-2024, QC No. JOP-24-26782; **Revised:** 14-Aug-2025, Manuscript No. JOP-24-26782 (R); **Published:** 21-Aug-2025, DOI: 10.35248/2378-5756.25.28.765

Citation: Penzance I (2025) Commentary: On the Theoretical Intuition of Jungian Archetypes and its Logical Extensions–“Purity and Unconsciousness”. *Psychiatry J.* 28:765.

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would not be even somewhat concerning and the expectation that the religion is simply a tradition would have been voided; thereby informing the validity of such qualitative statuses as being central to the subjective realities that they serve.

The future prospects of my article are to formalise the idea of Jung's Archetypes such that they themselves do not detract from significant questions about their own nature. For instance, by assuming a variable collective unconsciousnesses—the subjective reality—that is manifested in different contemporaries, the “primordial imagery” thereby does not consequently relate specifically to the generation of archetypal faculties, for which that is an object of humanity. Instead, the focus is granted extended, rather to the distinctly qualitative faculty in which the primordial imagery should lie that is common to all theoretical bodies of archetypal faculties. Yet, we understand the qualitative faculties to only be apparent in the distinct contemporary times

where they are present, and therefore we must consider overarching faculties (which themselves are of a scale that exceeds my article, yet they are included as a point of development).

CONCLUSION

And, too because we understand the qualitative difference in such a state as the pure to be able to manifest its own archetypal faculties, how can the idea of the aforementioned primordial imagery (where all is common) therefore be representative of the content that it holds; if such a significant difference is assumed in the nature of thought (and naturally, I may be quite wrong in assuming that such a nature of imagery can retain its causal archetypal faculty).