



# A Narrative on the Monarchy as Breeding Ground for the Revolutionary in the Roman Empire (509-527 Bce) and the Inspiration Modern Day State Politics Can Drawn From It

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## Abstract

In the history of Rome, the period 133-131 BCE is one of revolutionary violence, political unrest and internecine struggles – unique in their nefarious, fratricidal ferocity. The revolution was directed against a ruling aristocracy that based its privileged position on ownership of agricultural land and knowledge of the existing law. In order to maintain their supremacy, the aristocracy deliberately cultivated a weak central authority in the state. The state functioned by means of annually elected officers – members of the nobility who were accountable to their peers. Foreseeably, the revolution was conducted in the economic and political spheres, but soon developed a military character when revolutionary impatience could no longer be checked. In the economic field, the attempts of the Gracchi, starting in 133 BC, to curb land tenure by the nobility met with limited success, but the brutal and high-handed reaction of the senatorial aristocracy unleashed forces, which materially contributed to the conflagration that engulfed Rome in the next century. In the legal-political field, where law was an esoteric science closely guarded by the nobility, Servius Sulpicius, a teacher of law par excellence, sought to wrest this monopoly of legal learning from the nobility, *inter alia*, by introducing Greek philosophical ideas. His efforts ensured the systematisation and eventually the codification and immortality of Roman law, but yielded insufficient tangible results for the present. Ultimately, the initiative was seized by military leaders whose zeal in cutting down the lives of men can only be matched by that of a Gengis Khan, a Robespierre, and a Trotsky. The aristocracy was annihilated and replaced by a single ruler, unrestricted in his powers, euphemistically called *princeps*.

## 1. Introduction

McIlwain emphasises the value of the history of the Roman Republic for someone who wishes to understand our present political circumstances and institutions: “The oftener I survey the whole history of constitutionalism the more I am impressed with the significance and importance of the republican constitution of Rome in that development [...] modern absolutism was a return to Roman autocracy.”<sup>1</sup>

The history of the Roman Republic is the history of its ruling class.<sup>2</sup> This article is mainly concerned with the downfall of the aristocracy under the onslaught of revolutionary elements in the period 509-527 BC. The fall of the Roman Republic resulted in an absolutist government system, which can serve as model for the dictator, as is evident in the 20<sup>th</sup>/21<sup>st</sup> centuries in Africa and elsewhere.

## 2. The Aristocracy

The Roman aristocracy was, in the first instance, a unique kind of official nobility, which based its special position on land tenure and knowledge of the law.

With the expansion of Rome’s political power following the battle of Zama in 202 BC, a contentious problem arose for the ruling class. The aristocracy, used to the government of a city-state, could no longer afford sufficient staff to man the government posts in the Empire.

Likewise, the aristocracy realised that they could only have influence and power as long as there is no strong authority or ruler present. The re-establishment of the monarchy weighed heavily on the original Brutus’s (not Julius Caesar’s murderer) sons. In this instance, this can serve as an indication of the position of the aristocracy. Livius (2.3) mentions: “... *regem hominem esse, a quo impetres, ubi ius, ubi iniuria opus sit; esse gratiae locum, esse beneficium; et irasci et ognoscere posse, inter amicum atque inimicum discrimen nosse*” (... the king is a human being, of whom one can ask something, where there is justice or injustice, there is room for mercy and a benefit; he can be angry and forgive, he can distinguish between a friend and an enemy). Similarly, Albert Speer notes that there was no real independent power among the leaders of national-socialist Germany, because they tried to get influence from the head of state, who had all the real political power.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> McIlwain CH, 1940, *Constitutionalism ancient and modern*. New York: Cornell University Press, p. 434.

<sup>2</sup> Badian E, 1968, *Roman imperialism in the late republic*. Basil Blackwell, p. 92: “The study of the Roman Republic and that of the Empire to a considerable degree is basically the study, not of its economic development, or of its masses, or even of great individuals: it is chiefly the study of its ruling class ruling class.”

<sup>3</sup> Speer A, 1970, *Inside the Third Reich*. Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, p. 253: “The plan of these three men to surround Hitler, to filter his information and thus control his power, might have led to an abridgement of Hitler’s one-man rule, had the Committee of Three consisted of men possessing initiative, imagination and a sense of responsibility. But since they had been trained always to act in Hitler’s name, they slavishly depended on the expression of his will.” See also Heiden K, 1968, *Der Fuehrer: Hitler’s rise to power*. New York: Howard Fertig, p. 594: “Hitler’s optimism and self-confidence rose

Hans Habe compares the dictatorship to a puppet-show, where each puppet is attached by means of numerous strings to the entertainer's fingers, but the puppets themselves are not attached to each other. This means that the entertainer can manipulate the puppets to his/her heart's content, but the movement of a single puppet cannot influence another puppet.<sup>4</sup>

The result was that, at that time in Rome, a state with weak authority came into power, seated in the hands of annually chosen officials.<sup>5</sup> The only office that could really lead to a single strong power became obsolete in 216BC, probably due to the fear entertained by the aristocracy.<sup>6</sup> True authority was seated in the senate, which was exclusively an aristocratic body.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, Rome had no ministry of defence or head of the army. Armies were time and again recruited by an appointed general, as circumstances required.<sup>8</sup>

The result was that, as attempts were made since 133BC to remove the aristocracy, the attack came from two fronts. First, an attempt was made to undermine the aristocracy's power base by breaking their monopoly of political and legal knowledge and by depriving them of their land tenure. Secondly, the revolutionary leaders, in particular Julius Caesar,<sup>9</sup> succeeded in becoming that authority which the aristocracy so feared. They would do so by usurping the state's function of waging war and administration of justice, something that was easy to do in light of the weak position of power of the republican authority.

### 3. The Revolutionary Onslaught

As far as the nature of the onslaught is concerned, one must bear in mind that, when mentioning revolutionary leaders in the first century BC, such revolutionaries cannot be treated like, for instance, a Leon Trotsky, a Mao Tse Tung and a Herbert Marcuse.

When writing in the twentieth century about politics of the Roman Republic, the historian must necessarily use the terms "revolutionary", "anti-revolutionary", and so on. These terms are his/her tools, although at present these have a complex content and are too encompassing to describe the political system of 133BC to 27BC.<sup>10</sup>

In twentieth-century South Africa, one's affairs are determined, in general, by a Christian religious conviction and environment. On the other hand, there are powerful and comprehensive humanist currents of thought such as, for instance, Communism, that compete for control over man.<sup>11</sup>

There were no identifiable comprehensive ideologies in the late Roman Republic, (202-27BC). Neither were the religious leaders encouraged by a specific religion. Economic instability was the underlying problem. Religious values would fade, as religion took a backseat. In addition, the conduct of conservative leaders or honest reformers in a disorganised century was so twisted that it ultimately caused a revolution. For example, Sulla did his best to favour the senate and to turn back the clock to the era prior to Tiberius Gracchus,<sup>12</sup> but the position of power, which this angered

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by leaps and bounds; in the cabinet he demanded an end to voting: he as chairman would simply make all decisions; and how often decisions had been made before they were even presented to the cabinet."

<sup>4</sup> Habe H, 1956, *Off limits*. Harrap, p. 120: "For twelve years Germany had looked from the outside like a huge puppet theatre, with marionettes all suspended from the fingers of the great wire-pullers. But what distinguishes a puppet theatre from the great theatre of the world is the fact that every puppet dangles from numerous strings which all meet in the hands of the showman, but that there is not a single string by which one puppet is linked to another in the world theatre; on the other hand, countless strings connect man to man, and only a few of them end up in the files."

<sup>5</sup> Kunkel W, 1966, *An introduction to Roman legal and constitutional history*. Oxford University Press, p. 16: "Other factors, too, effectively limited the apparent omnipotence of magistral **imperium**. The duration of office was in principle restricted to one year (the so-called principle of annuality); and at any one time two or more magistrates with similar powers functioned alongside one another (the so-called principle of collegiality)."

<sup>6</sup> Hammond NGL & Scullard HH (eds), 1970, *The Oxford classical dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 339: "Despite a revival during the invasion of Hannibal, it was never again employed for its original purpose after 216BC. Perhaps because of senatorial jealousy of independent authorities."

<sup>7</sup> Wolff HJ, 1964, *Roman law: A historical introduction*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, p. 26: "Political power was thus concentrated in the hands of the landed upper class which filled the offices and thereby the seats in the Senate."

<sup>8</sup> Sallustius, *Iugurtha*, par. 86: "*Ipse interea milites scriber, non more maiorum, neque ex classibus, sed uti cuiusque libido erat, capite censos plerosque.*"; Marsch FB, 1971, *A history of the Roman world from 146 to 30 BC*. London: Methuen, p. 87: "The soldiers had enlisted to fight under a particular general."

<sup>9</sup> Cowell FA, 1962, *The revolutions of ancient Rome*. London: Thames & Hudson, p. 157: "Julius Caesar was the greatest revolutionary in Roman history."

<sup>10</sup> Alfödy G, 1979, *Römische Sozialgeschichte*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, p. 58: "Das der Begriff 'Revolution' für die zusammenfassende Charakterisierung dieser Konflikte nicht in dem Sinne wie in der jüngere Geschichte seit der Englischen und insbesondere seit der Französischen Revolution verwendet werden kann, ist freilich evident, da die sozialen und politischen Bewegungen der späten Republik eine gewaltsame Veränderung der bestehenden Gesellschaftsordnung weder erstrebten noch bewirkten."

<sup>11</sup> Ebenstein W, 1973, *Today's isms*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. XI-XII: "In the last analysis, distinct conceptions of the nature of man underlie the major isms, which can therefore be understood only as systems compassing the totality of social life rather than as mere collections of specific social, political, or economic institutions."

<sup>12</sup> Scullard HH, 1963, *From the Gracchi to Nero*. London: Methuen, p. 87: "Sulla's solution was apparently to give the senate another chance and to make the government more effective by curbing those faces that threatened it."

figure needed, gave new life to the dictatorship that had been dormant for so long. This dictatorship, *legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae*, would ultimately signify the fall of the Republic.

### 3.1 The Economic Onslaught

The economic onslaught by Tiberius Gracchus is crucial for this study. At an early stage in his life, Gracchus was introduced to Greek philosophy.<sup>13</sup>

As tribune in 133 BC, Gracchus tried to put through a *plebiscitum* that would restrict the ownership of state land to 500 *iugera* per person, with an additional 250 for a first son, and 500 for two or more sons. Those who owned more than these sizes of land had to cede them. In exchange for this, they would obtain tenure for the remainder of the state land in their possession.<sup>14</sup> Ambition and the search for popularity were certainly part of Gracchus's conduct.<sup>15</sup> His action was prompted by the social and political issues of his day. On his travels to Numantia, he noted a severe lack of small farmers and, on his arrival in Spain, he noted that the army was small and undisciplined.<sup>16</sup> In addition, he was appalled at the number of slaves in the rural areas and the resultant likelihood of onslaughts.<sup>17</sup> In addition to these political problems, there were also social issues created by the urban proletariat, who had to make a living in extreme poverty and desperate situations.<sup>18</sup>

One must, however, give Gracchus the benefit of the doubt and accept that he was an honest and genuine reformer. One must accept that his conduct was at first revolutionary, when disobliging members of the aristocracy (such as Scipio Nasica and Lucius Opimius) did not hesitate to use violence against Gracchus and his followers.<sup>19</sup> If it can be proven that Gracchus did foresee the consequences of his conduct, one would have, from the pre-Christian era, a modern textbook revolutionary. That is, an ideologically inspired thinker who exploits political and social evils in order to change the political order.

### 3.2 The Political Onslaught

The absence of an army and police force in Rome gave Julius Caesar and other lesser revolutionaries such as Claudius, his henchman, the opportunity to present themselves as leaders of the proletariat. In this role, Caesar used the tribunes as his henchmen. When Caesar failed in his attempt to save the Catilinarian conspirators, he lost, to a large extent, his credibility as leader of the *populares*.<sup>20</sup> Augustus succeeded Caesar – Caesar's failure is not attributed to Augustus, who was a tribune of the plebeians,<sup>21</sup> an office which Cicero occasionally described as "*in seditione et ad seditionem nata*"

<sup>13</sup> Smuts F, 1958, Stoïsynse invloed op Tiberius Gracchus. *Acta Classica*, vol. 1, p. 108: "Ons meen dat dit verbasend sou gewees het, as Tiberius nie deur Griekse filosofiese idees beïnvloed is nie, en meer spesifiek stoïsynse idees, as ons in aanmerking neem die huis waarin hy grootgeword het en die samelewing waarin hy geleef het, naamlik 150-130 v.C. in Rome."

<sup>14</sup> Astin AE, 1963, *Scipio Aemilianus*. London: Oxford University Press, p.193: "The essence of the plan, as is well known, was that a commission of three should allocate to landless citizens small holdings of publicly owned land, *ager publicus*, which had never been systematically distributed or rented out; and since wealthy investors had taken over much of this land, either by direct farming or by pasturing much larger herds and flocks than the law specified, the commissioners were to reclaim all in excess of the maximum holding permitted by law to any one person."

<sup>15</sup> Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 108: "Hierdie motiewe het dus sekerlik ook hul rol gespeel, maar Tiberius kan nie gesien word as bloot 'n eersugtige politikus of 'n demagoog en niks meer nie. As dit blote eersug was, sou hy ook genoeg beweegruimte kon gehad het binne sy eie aristokratiese groep. Daar moes ook diepliggend en meer idealistiese beweegredes gewees het om sy vuur en volgehoue deursetting te verklaar, veral as ons dit in verband bring met sy opregte en edele karakter en die werklik staatsmanagtige idees wat hy probeer ten uitvoer bring het."

<sup>16</sup> Cary M, 1957, *A history of Rome*. MacMillan, p. 282: "On his way to Numantia he had noted the dearth of small peasantry in Etruria, a land of large estates filled by servile workers. In Spain he had observed the deterioration of the Roman soldiery, and he had sought its cause in the decline of the Italian yeoman class."

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*: "An even more compelling proof of the dangers of slave cultivation had been offered to him by a recent insurrection in Sicily, where the servile population had risen en masse in 135 against its Greek and Roman landlords."

<sup>18</sup> Yavetz Z, The living conditions of the urban plebs, in: Seager R, *The crisis of the Roman republic*, p. 505: "One thing however is certain, namely that the inhabitants of the poorer quarters were crowded together in the upper storeys of the *insulae*, which were utterly unfitted for a normal and orderly family life."; Badian E, Cicero as a politician, lecture, UZ, 1974-08-31, p. 19: "The conditions in which the Roman poor lived are hardly within the compass of the imagination of anyone familiar with the modern Western welfare state."; Baker GP, 1936, *Twelve centuries of Rome*. London: Bell, p. 228: "The wild beasts he (Tiberius Gracchus) said have their dens, but the man who sacrifices his life for his country has nothing but the air and the sunshine to call his own."; Rewson E, 1975, *Cicero. A portrait*. London: Allen Lane, p. 60: "The poor of Rome lived always on the brink of disaster ... All lived crowded into blocks of flats, without decent sewage, water or cooking facilities and susceptible to frequent and disastrous collapses, floods and fires."

<sup>19</sup> Boren HC, The urban side of the Gracchus economic crises, in: Seagar R, 1969, *The crisis of the Roman republic*. Cambridge: Heffer, p. 840: "Uncompromising nobles like Scipio Nasica and Lucius Opimius, who did not hesitate to use violence against the Gracchi and their followers, must certainly be held chiefly accountable for this vicious nature of the subsequent factional strife which racked the state until Augustus."

<sup>20</sup> Gelzer M, 1949, *Pompeius*. München: Bruckman Verlag, p. 125: "Am 5. Dezember haate der Senat die Hinrichtung der fünf verhafteten Catilinarier gutgeheissen. Caesar der unter Berufung auf die popularen Grundsätze eindringlich vor diesem Beschluss gewant hatte, musste unter Lebensgefahr den Concordiatempel verlassen."

<sup>21</sup> Wolff HJ, 1964, *Roman law. A historical introduction*. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, p. 45: "In Rome itself, Augustus secured his permanent supremacy more indirectly but no less effectively, when he resigned the consulship,

(*De Legibus*, 3.19). Augustus thus continued the line of *tribuni* who, since 133BC, challenged the position of power of both the aristocracy and the senate.

Consequently, Caesar proceeded to obtain the support of the army. On account of what was mentioned earlier concerning the weakness of the Roman state in this respect, one must note that the army was a powerful political weapon in the hands of ambitious generals. Following Marius's reforms, and as a result of the system where the general is responsible for compensation in the form of land upon the soldier's return, the Roman soldier was more loyal to his general than to the state.<sup>22</sup>

After his service in Gallia, where Caesar gained military experience and was backed by an army,<sup>23</sup> he used the garrison under his command against Rome.<sup>24</sup> Caesar experienced great success with this, because, at the end of the civil war, the Republic was something of the past.<sup>25</sup> The revolution was a great success.

#### 4. Conclusion

The famous *Clementia Caesaris* confirms that Caesar forgave all his enemies.

His immediate successors and the later emperor were not so clement, with the result that, by the end of the first century AD, the Roman aristocracy was totally wiped out.<sup>26</sup> What Hoettle mentioned of the Hungarian aristocracy many centuries later after the Second World War also applies to the Roman aristocracy: "The ruling class which had governed the country for centuries and which had hoped to save something by capitulation, was itself stricken down and annihilated."<sup>27</sup>

Caesar's successors did not leave room for a likely revival of the Republic.

#### 5. Concluding Remark

It is obvious that these individuals, who wished to make changes to the Republican system in which they lived, came across Greek philosophy. Without deciding on the nature and scope of the Greek influence on the Roman revolution, one may safely allege that the student who came across the Greek ideal of excellence and the claim that man must be a free political partner in the governing process in order to obtain full self-realisation, would not be satisfied with the political and social circumstances in the Republic in the period under discussion.<sup>28</sup> The Romans were different and, to

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he received for life the *tribunica potestas*, cf. the rights and powers of a tribune of the plebs – in other words, the rights of inviolability, of veto, of summoning the Senate, and of bringing bills before the assembly of the plebs. This power, too, was bestowed on Tiberius and became a regular attribute of the emperors."

<sup>22</sup> Marsh FB, 1971, *A history of the Roman world from 146 to 30 BC*. London: Methuen, p. 87: "The new system had other consequences as well. Henceforth the army belonged to the commander to a degree unknown in the past. The soldiers had enlisted to fight under a particular general, and they would not patiently permit him to be superseded by another, who might not hold himself bound by his predecessor's engagements."; Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 24: "Denn es wurde jetzt für Imperator, einen siegreichen Feldherrn möglich, durch geschickte Behandlung, Beuteverteilung und Versprechen grossartiger Versorgung ein solches aus Berufssoldaten gebildetes Heer derart in seine Hand zu bekommen, das er es im politischen Kampf einsetzen konnte. Beruhte schon bisher die Macht der römischen Politiker auf der Klientel, der Zahl von Freunden und abhängigen Leuten, die eine für wahlen und sonstigen Abstimmungen aufzubieten vermochte, so trat mit der Heeresklientel eine Grösse in politische Leben, die das übliche Kräftespiel über den Haufen warf und jene Verlagerung der politischen Kämpfe bewirkte."; Jones AHM, 1970, *Augustus*. London: Chatto and Windus, p. 5: "One of the effects of Marius' recruiting policy had been greatly to strengthen the hold which a commander had over his men, born in service and after. The landless peasants who formed the bulk of the armies knew that they depended on their commander to get them the smallholdings that they craved – the senate automatically blocked any land bill – and they therefore gave him their political support."; Badian, *op. cit.*, p. 10: "Marius had opened the army to them (previously they had been debarred from serving), and many joined it. Since they had little stake in the aristocratic Republic, the result was that they were ready to follow anyone who offered them booty."

<sup>23</sup> Rostortzeff M, 1960, *A history of the ancient world, vol. II*. London: Oxford University Press, p. 137: "It enabled him to gain a military reputation, an army devoted to his person, and unlimited material resources."

<sup>24</sup> Syme R, 1939, *The Roman revolution*. London: Oxford University Press, p. 47: "Sulla was the first Roman to lead an army against Rome."

<sup>25</sup> Lucanus, *Pharsalia*, 1.670: *Cum domino pax ista vanit*.

<sup>26</sup> Wilkinson LP, 1974, *The Roman experience*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, p.95: "The formation of the second Triumvirate – Antony, Lepidus and Octavian – was followed by ruthless proscriptions of which Cicero was among the victims, and many *equites* suffered for their wealth as well as senators for their politics."; Stark F, 1966, *Rome on the Euphrates. The story of a frontier*. London: John Murray Albemark, p. 145: "This aristocracy had been decimated as never before at Philippi."; Walker B, 1952, *The annals of Tacitus. A study in the writing of history*. Manchester University Press, p. 180: "It has been estimated that at the end of Domitian's reign not more than thirty senators of the old Republican families remained."

<sup>27</sup> Hoettle W, 1953, *The secret front*. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, p. 226; Chisholm K & Ferguson J, 1981, *Rome, the Augustus age*. Oxford University Press, p. 489: "The account in Tacitus Annals of Tiberius' reign reads like the death knell of a whole class – the Roman aristocratic families."

<sup>28</sup> Robinson CE, 1962, *A history of Greece*. Methuen, p. 374: "His ideal of life was the fullest possible development of all the human powers and faculties, physical and moral, emotional and intellectual."; Kitto HDF, 1960, *The Greeks*. Penguin Books, p. 161: "Its ideal was that every citizen (more or less, according as the polis was democratic or oligarchic) should play his part in all of its many activities – an ideal that is recognizably descended from the generous Humeric

some extent, optimists. Their politicians or jurists believed that they could casuistically solve problems as they arose without setting a general rule that had to meet the legal order. When the problem was solved, the legal order would re-establish itself. Their politicians believed that, if they remove Caesar, nothing more was necessary. The Republic would establish itself again in Rome.<sup>29</sup>

Contrary to the Stoic view that only a select few could be educated, Cicero was of the opinion that the entire population could be educated.<sup>30</sup> He believed that one has an inbred sense for justice and, if anything were still missing, this could be supplemented by education.<sup>31</sup> To the Roman, the world was created well, and when problems arose, they could simply be solved. Then everything would be as it was previously. The civil war was thus waged with this attitude; the Republic was ousted, and the Romans had no clear new system to replace it. The Roman civil war was thus not a Russian Revolution waged for the sake of a totally new political and social system.

## 6. Final Remarks

Ultimately, after the Republic's fall, three leaders, namely emperors Sulla, Caesar and Augustus emerged and filled a position with unrestricted power.

It is surprising that Sulla used his power in such a way that it totally baffled his contemporaries and has kept everyone since then wondering.<sup>32</sup> A conspiracy against Caesar ended in Brutus murdering him. Tired and ill, after a life of superhuman activity, Caesar knew of the conspiracy against him, but did nothing to keep himself safe.<sup>33</sup> Augustus was never without grit, despite an especially long political career. But, towards the end of his time as emperor, he started seeking a successor in a way that one could sympathise with him. Ultimately, he had to name the unwilling and hard to accept Tiberius.<sup>34</sup> It would appear though that these politicians realised that it was not their fate to lift the population out of the economic and political instability and military unrest.

As a result of the political instability, the issue increasingly emerged as to a new political leadership that would maintain and promote civilised values. It was observed that such leadership would free the Roman State from its pagan foundation. An imperial leader did indeed come forward, namely Constantine the Great (ruling period 305-337AD).<sup>35</sup> What can be labelled as a *Republica Christiana* has developed into the Western Christian political system, due to the new political endeavour that has since characterised the Roman state. Christian leadership in Africa, in general, and in South Africa, in particular, can draw special inspiration from this.

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conception of *arête* as an all-round excellence and an all-round activity.”; Guthrie WKC, 1956, *The Greek philosophers*. Methuen, p. 153: “All men, he (Aristotle) says, seek happiness. It is the goal of human life ... if we are efficient as human beings, possessing the *arête* of man, then the activity which we shall perform in virtue of that *arête* will be happiness.”

<sup>29</sup> Cary, *op. cit.*, p. 422: “The *tyrannicides* had planned the murder of Caesar well, but they had planned nothing more. Their calculations had gone no further than this, that the forcible removal of the dictator Caesar would have the same effect as the voluntary abdication of the dictator Sulla, and that on the release of the brake, the machinery of senatorial government would automatically resume work.”

<sup>30</sup> Dickinson J, 1963, *Death of a republic*. New York: The Macmillan Company, p. 296: “In the Stoic view, however, this participation was an ideal achieved by only a very few human individuals – the narrowly limited number who could measure up to the standard of the Stoic “Sage” or “wise man” to which Cicero’s contemporary, the Younger Cato, so earnestly aspired.”

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.X.28: “*Nihil est profecto praestabilius quam plane intellegi nos ad iustitiam esse natos, neque opinio, sed natura constitutum esse ius.*” *Ibid.*, 3.Xiii.29: “*Nam cum omni vitio curere lex iubeat, ne veniet quidem in eum ordinem quisquam vitii particeps id autem difficile factu est nisi educatione quadam et disciplina.*”

<sup>32</sup> Balsdon JPD, 1967, *Julius Caesar and Rome*. London: The English Universities Press, p. 26: “In 79, he resigned – an act which, late in his life Julius Caesar was to stigmatize as the behavior of an ignoramus – and, retiring into the raffish private life from which he had originally emerged, he died a year later.”

<sup>33</sup> Grant M, *Julius Caesar*. London: Widenfield & Nicholson, p. 217: “Moreover, his physical health, which had usually been good, was showing signs of giving way.”; Meyer E, 1963, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus. Innere Geschichte Roms von 66 bis 44, v. Chr.* Stuttgart: JG Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, p. 534: “Das seinem Leben Gefahr drohte, wusste Caesar sehr wohl, er kannte die Römer gut genug, um zu wissen, wie sie über sein Verhalten denken mussten.”

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<sup>35</sup> Boak AER, 1955, *A history of Rome to 565AD*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, p. 429.